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Sainsbury’s in Egypt : The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde ? 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Purpose – First, to explore the role of institutional theory constructs in a case of 
international retail divestment.  Second, to examine the potential of constructed 
metaphors as a means of analyzing and communicating the findings of managerial 
research 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach – the data was generated from participant 
observations and interactions with stakeholder groups during a three month 
ethnographic study based in a Sainsbury store in Egypt.  Data was analysed and 
presented via a constructed metaphor – namely Robert Louis Stevenson’s story of Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
 
Findings – the case illustrated an apparent paradox between Sainsbury’s technical 
superiority as a retail operator in the Egyptian market, and its social inferiority in its 
interactions with a variety of stakeholders, primarily customers and employees. The 
use of the metaphor to organize, analyse and present the findings proves to be a 
fruitful way to illustrate these issue,  and parallels between the two “stories” provide 
further insights into behaviour – the denial of responsibility for (and the existence of) 
social inadequacies; and the implicit (and inevitable) existence of the capacity for 
social inadequacy in any business organization. 
 
Practical Implications – the potential to communicate managerial lessons by telling 
“stories” (the case) through well known “stories” (the novel) is highglighted. 
 
Originality/Value – the use of the constructed metaphor to analyse a case of 
international retail divestment is, to our knowledge, unique and enhancers our 
understanding of the legitimisatyion process and the role of socio-moral codes in this 
process. 
 
Keywords - Sainsbury; Egypt; institutional approach, divestment, metaphor 
 
Paper Type – research paper 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Retailers have experienced mixed fortunes in their attempts to internationalise 
their operations. Until relatively recently, the retail internationalization literature has 
focused on cases of successful international investment, whilst under-representing 
examples of divestment (Alexander and Quinn, 2002; Burt et al, 2003; 2004; 
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Alexander et al, 2005). However, studies of divestment add value by shedding light 
on the broader context within which international retail management operates 
(Palmer, 2004).  The application of institutional theory to retail internationalization 
also widens the focus of investigation by exploring the wider symbolic (subjective) 
impact of the retailers’ technical (objective) internationalisation strategies on all of the 
social institutions found in the host market (Arnold et al, 2001; Bianchi and Arnold, 
2004; Bianchi and Ostale, 2005).   
This paper illustrates the value of the institutional approach to retail 
internationalization by reporting the findings of an ethnographic study of Sainsbury’s 
withdrawal from Egypt.  The case illustrates an apparent paradox between the 
objective technical superiority of the company’s retail strategy and operational 
practices, and its symbolic social inferiority - the embedded social implications of this 
superiority. As such, metaphorically, parallels may be drawn with Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s classic story  The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde  in which the 
leading character possesses a split personality exhibiting both “outward (objective) 
sanctity and inward/secret (symbolic/subjective) iniquity” (Mighall, 2003).   By 
framing the findings in this way, the paper illustrates the role of the metaphor in 
communicating managerial implications. 
 
Retail Internationalization: The Contribution of the Institutional Approach 
Retail internationalization is a multi-dimensional process.  Most existing 
studies, however, have a tendency to focus on a single dimension (eg motives, entry 
methods, image transfer) at a specific point in time.  This implies that researchers tend 
to adopt a micro-view of retail internationalization, based a specific aspect or incident 
in the life of the business. Consequently there have been many calls for the retail 
internationalization literature to broaden its conceptual base to take into account the 
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multi-dimensional nature of the process.  The natural outcome of such a shift in focus 
is the adoption of a more holistic and macro-based view of  retail internationalization. 
Country culture has often formed the underlying basis for a wider framework, 
and the “fit” with host country culture has been seen as a key factor in determining the 
success and failure of retail internationalization.   Dupuis and Prime (1996) argue that 
culture shapes the behaviour of every aspect in the retail business: customers; staff; 
the retail marketing mix (communication, merchandise, etc.); the channel mix (e.g. 
suppliers); and the environment (e.g. public opinion, legal, and political 
environments).   More recently, institutional theory has been applied to retail 
internationalization (Arnold et al. 2001; Bianchi and Arnold, 2004).  This approach 
argues that the retail industry in every country has its own set of institutional norms, 
which have been established and evolved over time through the interactions of 
different social actors within the setting of the local culture.  Institutional theory 
suggests that international retailers have to gain legitimacy and support from the 
social actors in order to be successful in a host market.  Arnold et al (2001) suggest 
that successful retailers have an “isomorphic” response to both the objective 
(task/economic) and symbolic (institutional/social-moral) norms of the culture in 
which they operate. This can be achieved via effective technical performance (e.g. 
good locations, best price etc.) and effective social performance in “institutional acts” 
(e.g. support for family; community; nation, etc.)  
The major contribution of the institutional approach is its broad macro-
perspective, which balances the role of social and moral norms with economic factors, 
towards understanding the international retailing process. The institutional approach 
emphasizes the social and ethical values underpinning the behaviour of local market 
stakeholders. The adoption of a socio-ethical orientation provides corporate 
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legitimacy for international firms in host cultures, whilst failure to do so implies that a 
business is pursuing an essentially ego-centric view of the world (Karakowsky et al, 
2005; Murphy et al, 2005).  Such business egotism increases the vulnerability of the 
firm as it contradicts the morality of local marketplace and becomes self-defeating 
(Bowie, 2001).        
The study of divestment cases provides the best means for assessing the 
impact of socio-ethical issues on retail internationalization, as they come to the fore in 
most of these cases.  For example, Marks & Spencer’s policy of standardizing its 
British retail model proved to be a self-defeating strategy in Canada through its failure 
to recognize differences in clothing cultural norms between the two countries (Burt et 
al 2002).  Similarly in France, the motive for Marks & Spencer’s departure, in order 
to restructure its operations at home, impacted upon the French employees and 
national retail/business norms, leading to accusations of immoral and unethical 
behaviour (Jackson et al, 2005)  
Social as well as ethical violations of local market norms can also be seen in 
the cases of the Home Depot, Carrefour, Ahold and J.C. Penney in Chile (Bianchi and 
Arnold, 2004; Bianchi, 2006, Bianchi and Ostale, 2006).  These retailers owing to 
their financial and technical power as well as their rich international experience, 
entered Chile as “superior operators” bringing with them their own executives to 
ensure that business was done in the “company way” without any consideration of the 
prevailing social norms in the local retail industry. This approach excluded them from 
the networking culture prevalent amongst retailers in Chile.  Such corporate egotism 
provoked a backlash from local competitors who collectively worked together with 
Chilean executives to defend their market positions. This encouraged customers to 
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defect to the local retailers because of their more balanced technical/social offering, 
which, ultimately, forced these giant retailers to withdraw.    
In the case of Wal-Mart, Burt and Sparks (2006) identified the driving forces 
behind Wal-Mart’s business model as an interrelated mix of: culture; supply systems; 
cost and price control; innovation; and market destabilization.  Despite the sheer scale 
of the business, and its seemingly inexorable growth, when these key elements of the 
business model proved difficult to transfer because of established economic and social 
norms of behaviour to a host market – perhaps best illustrated by the German 
experience – even the largest retailer in the world failed. 
As the above cases suggest, transferring successful (objective) business 
models from a domestic to a host culture is a risky business, which can stumble on the 
(symbolic) socio-ethical hurdle that provides the necessary legitimacy for the business 
model to be embraced by local stakeholders. The current literature on retail 
divestment however tends to  focus on studying cases from a strategic (objective) 
perspective as they tend to be constructed from the retailer standpoint (Alexander et 
al, 2005; Palmer and Quinn, 2007).  The reluctance of retailers to speak openly and 
comprehensively about their negative experiences abroad (Palmer, 2004; Alexander et 
al 2005; Palmer and Quinn, 2007) has led to calls for a broadening in the focus of 
divestment cases to cover the symbolic perspectives.  This requires an examination of 
the wider environment in which international retailers operate, and in turn, improves 
the ‘generative’ learning process in international retailing (Palmer and Quinn, 2005; 
Palmer and Quinn, 2007).   
By adopting the institutional approach, this paper seeks to highlight the 
interplay between the objective and the symbolic side of retail internationalization via 
an analysis of the divestment of the British retailer J.Sainsbury from Egypt. The case 
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illustrates the impact of socio-ethical legitimacy, a central tenant of institutional 
theory, on the stability of an international retailer in a host market. This provides 
insights into a paradoxical interplay between the retailer’s clear objective “technical 
superiority” and its hidden symbolic “socio-ethical inferiority” from the standpoint of 
the local social actors. The case also further illustrates the value of the institutional 
approach to ‘generate’ learning within the international retailing literature and 
particularly within the context of retail divestment.  
 
Methodology 
Given the symbolic (socio-ethical) emphasis embedded within the institutional 
approach, research in the area tends be interpretive and qualitative in nature (Arnold 
et al, 2001).  As this paper aims to understand the interplay for socio-ethical 
legitimacy between the objective and the symbolic behaviour of a retail organization 
(J. Sainsbury) within a host retail culture (the social actors within the Egyptian 
grocery retail sector), the relationships between the retail organization and the social 
actors should be studied through an interpretive and qualitative form of inquiry.  
Ethnography is commonly identified as the most effective interpretive qualitative 
method for studying the sociology of organizations in their external environment 
(Morrill and Fine, 1997).        
The Role of Ethnography in Management Research  
 Ethnography is defined as the art and science of describing and interpreting a 
cultural or a social group/system (Creswell, 1998; Punch, 1999).   The resulting 
detailed description allows for the dissection of social interactions within a system to 
form a dialectical interpretation of it (Thomas, 1983). Hence, in management, 
ethnography has been seen as a potent methodology to decipher the social 
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consumption (by social actors/stakeholders) of the managerial activities of 
organizations (Sherry, 1990; Arnould and Wallendorf, 1994; Morrill and Fine, 1997; 
Brownlie, 1997; Mariampolski, 1999; Elliott and Jankel-Elliott, 2003).  This form of 
managerial ethnography studying the impact of management on society has been 
referred to as ‘ethnographies on organizing’ differentiating it from ‘ethnographies of 
organizing’ that tend to study systems of managing organizations (Arnould and 
Wallendorf, 1994).  Ethnographies of organizing have formed the dominate type of 
ethnographic study in retail management (e.g. Griod, 2002) and international retailing 
(eg Quinn, 1999).   However, this form of ethnography has been criticized for 
providing a narrow managerial focus that misses the wider social context within 
which managerial activities takes place (Brownlie, 1997).  The ‘ethnographies on 
organizing’ approach has seldom been adopted to study the “retail ecology” - the 
social interdependence between production and consumption of retail activities 
(Sherry, 1990). 
  This paper therefore adopts an ethnographic on organizing approach to the 
case of Sainsbury’s divestment in Egypt.  The ethnographic approach of a locally 
based longitudinal in-depth study is an ideal method of enquiry for understanding “the 
experience” (ecology) of retail globalisation as its effects are produced and consumed/ 
received at the local level (Burawoy, 2001).  
Doing Ethnography: the case study 
Participant observation is the main tool used in ethnographic research 
(Creswell, 1998; Punch, 1999).  Rather than understanding social interactions from an 
outsider standpoint via formally structured interviews and official documents, 
participant observation provides an understanding from an insider standpoint, 
unraveling the genuine attitudes of the social actors involved - via prolonged informal 
 8
direct participation in natural settings (Arnould and Wallendrof, 1994; Mariampolski, 
1999, Flick, 2002; Elliott and Jankel-Elliott, 2003).  Participant observation is 
therefore seen as a powerful tool in international marketing studies as it captures 
respondents’ behaviour in-action and with a heightened degree of cultural sensitivity 
(Pawle, 1999). 
 Thus, to explore Sainsbury’s interactions with the social actors in the Egyptian 
retail grocery market, a participant observation study was conducted in the natural 
setting of Sainsbury’s flagship store in Egypt - that is the first and largest Sainsbury’s 
store located in Greater Cairo at El-Haram Street, Giza.  Direct participation in 
Sainsbury’s interactions with the social actors present in the store (customers and 
employees) was accessed through this store.  Hence, the study focused on 
understanding the effects of Sainsbury’s on the Egyptian retail society from the 
standpoint of customers and employees.  Data on customer and employee perspectives 
were collected through informal one-to-one and mini group discussions with 
consumers (individuals and families) and employees both inside and outside the store 
setting.   Further data was generated from a review of the independent (not company 
sponsored) press reports.  The reports used were selected only if they covered the 
Sainsbury case from the standpoint of local social actors, such as competitors and 
economic experts, as well as customers and employees.  This data was used to explore 
the macro level effect of the company on the national level.   To understand the 
company perspective, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the British 
store manager and the British marketing manager (each interview lasting for 
approximately two hours), alongside a review of official documents (e.g. annual 
reports, press releases, in-house documents and commissioned research projects).      
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The study lasted for three months and ended with the closure of all 
Sainsbury’s stores in Egypt. Despite the timing of the closure, which was beyond the 
researchers control, the length of time spent in the field was long enough to allow the 
collection sufficient data since one of the authors, an Egyptian national, studied the 
case in his own culture - which enables researchers to expedite data collection and 
interpretation (Fetterman, 1998).  
Analyzing and Presenting Ethnographic Data: the role of constructed metaphors   
According to Fetterman (1998), ethnographers assume a holistic outlook to 
attain a comprehensive (multi-dimensional) view of a social system. Thus, in 
ethnographic studies, data analysis and presentation is fully integrated (Fetterman, 
1998, Flick, 2002). This integration enables the researcher to simultaneously tap into 
the insiders’ (emic) perspective and place it in the overall external (etic) perspective. 
This process is known as contextualization, which means placing observations into 
larger theoretical contexts/insights, and hence made Baszanger and Dodier (1997) 
believe that ‘relating the part to the whole’ is the major contribution of ethnography to 
qualitative research.  
The process of linking the part to the whole in ethnography is presented 
creatively through converting lived experiences (emic perspectives) into memorable 
stories (etic perspectives) via the use of various artistic genres (e.g. fiction, poetry, 
music, etc.) (Fetterman, 1998; Atkinson et al 1999; Humphreys et al, 2003). Amongst 
these artistic genres, the potent ability of fiction to create illuminating insights in the 
filed of management is well documented (Stanley, 1966; Brown, 1995; Grey, 1996; 
Watson, 2000; De Cock and Land, 2005). Classical literature is argued to be an 
invaluable source for critical management thinking (Shaw and Locke, 1993; Cohen, 
1998) as it illuminates the social/human side of management ensuring a balanced 
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orientation between the objective (inhuman) and the subjective (human) orientations 
to management (Linstead, 1994; De Cock and Land, 2005).  The analysis of fictional 
novels generate crucial ‘socio-theoretical insights’ for managerial research since they 
depict their authors’ creative, deep and rich understanding of social behavior (Brown, 
1995; Grey, 1996; Watson, 2000). Although the use of fiction in analysis is also 
criticized as ‘self-limiting’ since its generalizations tend to be context-specific (De 
Cock and Land, 2005), such a limitation constitutes a strength of interpretive 
qualitative research through its ability to develop- from limited contexts- creative, 
deep and rich theoretical insights (Sherry, 1990; Gummesson, 2005).  
Fiction as an analytical strategy generates constructed metaphors that are not 
just forms of discourse like literal metaphors, but multilayered discourse strategies 
that help researchers, through crossing phenomenon, develop new perspectives that 
enrich their subjects’ theoretical base (Morgan, 1980; Cornelissen, 2003, 2006; Wee, 
2005).  The theoretical contribution of constructed metaphors to retail management 
studies is well documented (Whysall, 2001; Davies and Ward, 2002).  Miles and 
Huberman (1994) argued that metaphors have an all-encompassing role in integrating 
the process of qualitative data analysis.  This can be illustrated by matching the 
process of constructing a metaphor (Cornelissen, 2006) to Miles and Huberman’s 
stages of qualitative data analysis (see table 1).   
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Table 1: Matching the process of constructing a metaphor with that of qualitative data 
analysis 
Stages of Constructing a Metaphor Stages of Qualitative Data Analysis 
Matching: when the researcher outlines 
general similarities between two different 
concepts based on the data collected 
Data Reduction: initial analysis to 
compress qualitative data under common 
themes 
Blending: when the researcher develops 
analytically the similarities between the 
natures of the two concepts that have not 
been recognized before. 
Data Display: data presentation in a 
manner  that eases pattern-
spotting/comparison 
 
Creating Meaning: when the researcher 
discusses the contribution of the new 
perspective that the newly developed 
metaphor can bring to the concept to 
which the metaphor is drafted 
Conclusion Drawing: drawing meanings 
and verifying them from the data to 
conclude the research and/or suggest 
further exploration 
 
      
Capitalizing on the analytical power of fictional novels as constructed 
metaphors, the researchers treated the divestment case of Sainsbury’s Egypt as an 
instrumental case study (Stake, 1998) analyzed to provide socio-theoretical insights 
into international retailers’ processes of socio-ethical legitimation through the 
fictional context of Robert Louis Stevenson’s story of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.  Early 
insights from the case highlighted a contrast between Sainsbury’s objective 
superiority and symbolic/social inferiority in the Egyptian market.  This raised the 
potential for an analogy between Sainsbury’s personality in Egypt and the split 
personality of the main character in the novel, reflecting the matching stage of 
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creating a metaphor.    Deeper probing into the case, revealed that Sainsbury’s 
exhibited even more behavioral similarities to that of the main character.  These 
similarities are demonstrated in the paper’s presentation of findings section and 
represent the blending stage in constructing a metaphor.  Finally, a discussion of the 
contribution of the lessons learned from the tale to our understanding of retail 
internationalization process is presented, reflecting the creating meaning stage.    
           
The Case of Sainsbury’s in Egypt: the background  
Before analyzing Sainsbury’s Egyptian experience, it should first be placed in 
the wider context through a brief background to grocery retailing in Egypt, and of 
Sainsbury’s international operations.  
Grocery Retailing in Egypt   
“The Egyptian food distribution system is inefficient, expensive, wasteful and 
unsanitary. Annual post-harvest losses, with an estimated farm-gate value of L.E. 700 
million, would fill four columns of trucks bumper-to-bumper from Aswan (the far 
south of Egypt) to Alexandria (the far north of Egypt). The small scale of most food 
operations is the principle cause of these conditions.” (National Co-operative 
Business Association, 1986, p.iii).  
 
This quote from the mid 1980’s summarizes the food distribution system in 
Egypt and, indeed, all developing countries (Feller, 1986). Although this assessment 
is twenty years old, it is still felt to be valid, as small-scale food retailing dominates 
the structure of contemporary grocery retailing in Egypt.  Retail Monitor International 
(2000a; 2000b) provides some more recent views based on the 1993 to 1998 period.  
In 1998, the grocery-retailing sector accounted for 64.7% of total retail sales, and the 
vast majority of food retail sales in Egypt were attributed to small, independent and 
largely family-owned outlets.  The remaining grocery retail sales were accounted for 
by supermarket chains and food specialists, such as butchers, bakers and Laban (dairy 
product specialists). Egypt has a relatively small number of supermarket chains and 
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supermarket store size usually does not exceed 2500 sq. m. The main chains are 
Metro, Edge (the chain acquired by Sainsbury) and ABC (a privately owned chain) 
Socially, supermarkets are regarded as expensive and up-market shops tailored for 
upper classes (National Co-operative Business Association, 1986; ACNielsen AMER, 
1999a; Retail Monitor International, 2000a).  The growth of supermarket chains has 
not however restricted the growth of independent retailers which remain the nerve of 
grocery retailing for Egyptian consumers. This is reflected in the AC Nielsen AMER 
(1999b) characterization of typical Egyptian grocery-shopping behavior: the grocery 
purchase decision-maker in the household is the female; and grocery shopping 
typically entails on average trips to five types of outlet including specialty stores (e.g. 
butcher, laban etc.), open markets (mainly for fruit and vegetables), and grocery 
shops.  
 As small scale retailing is the dominant feature of Egyptian grocery retailing, 
employment within the sector is characterized by poor salaries, and a small scale 
workforce that is male dominated (CAPMAS, 1998; Retail Monitor International, 
2000a,). The National Co-operative Business Association (1986) described retailers in 
Egypt as : 
 “shrewd traders who operate on the pocket theory, which is if there is more money in 
my pocket than I started with today, I am doing okay”.(p.12)  
 
Sainsbury’s International Operations    
Until it was overtaken by Tesco in the mid 1990’s J Sainsbury plc was the 
UK’s leading grocery retailer.  Despite being founded in 1869, like most British 
grocery retailers it remained a domestic business until 1983 when a minority stake 
was acquired in the 41 store American regional chain Shaw’s Supermarkets for £13.4 
million.  In June 1987, Sainsbury’s assumed control of Shaws, and its attempts to 
grow and develop this business have been well documented by Wrigley (1997a; 
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1997b, 2000) and others (Shackleton,1998, 1996; Muskett, 2000).   In 2004 Shaw’s, 
now a business with a turnover of £2.7million and over 200 stores, was sold to 
Albertsons for £1.18 billion.        
Sainsbury’s Egyptian subsidiary, Edge SAE, was the company’s second 
international assignment after the US. Edge was established by the El-Nasharty group 
in 1997 and was listed on the Cairo Stock Exchange in October 1998. In March 1999, 
J-Sainsbury acquired a 25.1% share in Edge with its 74 stores for £100 million, and 
raised this stake to 80.1% in October 1999, for a further £40 million. The first 
supermarket in Egypt to trade under the Sainsbury banner opened in February 2000, 
and by November 2000 Sainsbury operated 106 supermarkets and neighbourhood 
stores in the greater Cairo area.  
However, on April 9th 2001, only 14 months after the opening of the first 
Sainsbury store, the company announced that it had decided to pull out of the market 
and sell the subsidiary to its Egyptian partner.  In financial terms the Egyptian 
investment appeared a disaster.  The Annual Reports for 2000 and 2001 showed 
consolidated sales of £24 million and £80 million, generating operating losses of £11 
million and £24 million respectively.  The company commented that these losses were 
due to difficult trading conditions such as trading permit delays, and the deteriorating 
political situation in the Middle East (the Palestinian uprising occurred in September 
2000).   Within the context of a poor Group financial performance in 2000 and 2001, 
a strategic review led to the decision to focus on the core UK grocery business which 
entailed the sale of the Egyptian operation plus the Homebase chain in the UK.   
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Sainsbury’s Egypt: the early insights 
 
“….the arrival (in Egypt) of the first major western supermarket chain has caused 
nearly as much public disquiet and controversy as the recent endorsement of divorce 
for women (in Egypt)”. (Gordon, 2000 p.1) 
 
According to El-Hamamsy (1977), as Egypt was ruled by foreign superpowers 
(e.g. Greeks, Romans, French, and British) prior to Nasser’s 1952 revolution, 
Egyptian identity developed a love/hate relationship with foreign “superiors”: love for 
the economic power they brought to the country, but hate for the potential threat to 
traditional social values. The arrival of Sainsbury as a superior retail operator 
reignited this old love/hate relationship, but in the realm of business globalization 
rather than political colonialization.  Sainsbury’s arrival brought professional 
management systems to an otherwise underdeveloped retail grocery market and was 
even viewed by one customer as bringing “civilization to Egypt”!  Despite the implied 
support in this statement, the embedded social and ethical implications of Sainsbury’s 
‘civilization’ on the wider retail grocery community also stirred other emotions, with 
many condemning Sainsbury’s as a villain.  
One Egyptian couple aptly summarized the Sainsbury’s experience as:  
“Sainsbury’s knew what is needed in the market but did not know how to do it”.   
Whilst Sainsbury’s succeeded in addressing the technical needs of the Egyptian 
grocery market, it failed to deliver these needs within the social context.  As a result, 
Sainsbury was perceived to have a double face: outward technical superiority with 
inward social inferiority.  The lessons learned from Sainsbury’s experience in Egypt 
echoes that learned from the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, which revolves around 
the central characters split personality of “outward sanctity” and “inward/secret 
iniquity” (Mighall, 2003).  To match the literary metaphor with the case, it can be 
argued that Dr. Jekyll personifies the Sainsbury strategy of “outward sanctity” in what 
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is offered, whilst Mr. Hyde personifies the “inward iniquity” of the strategy as seen in 
the reaction of the community to how it was offered.  
 
Sainsbury’s Egypt: the ethnographic findings  
 
The following presentation and analysis of the ethnographic data gathered 
from Egypt (the natural setting) will illustrate the process of blending the tale with the 
case through an understanding of the customer and employee standpoint (the social 
actors under study)  in two ways:  first the social actors’ view of what was offered by 
Sainsbury’s strategy - as mirroring Dr. Jekyll’s behaviour in the tale;  second the 
social actors’ interpretation of how the strategy was implemented - as mirroring Mr. 
Hyde’s behaviour in the tale.  The analysis will conclude with a discussion of the 
lessons learnt from the constructed metaphor and its contribution to our understanding 
the process of retail internationalization.  
 Sainsbury’s as Dr. Jekyll: the outward sanctity in its retail strategy in Egypt  
Dr. Jekyll is presented in the tale as a righteous professional who is well-
respected in society (Mighall, 2003). Sainsbury’s strategy in Egypt was crafted to 
portray that image of Dr. Jekyll. According to the Sainsbury’s Marketing Director in 
Egypt, a British national, the bedrock of the strategy was to offer “quality food to 
ordinary people”.  This would ultimately lead to a better life for Egyptians. The 
Sainsbury strategy was to be customer oriented: offering Egyptian consumers great 
quality, value for money, helpful service, and real respect for the local culture. Based 
on commissioned assessments of Egyptian consumer buying behaviour, it was 
decided that the primary target was the family, and particularly the housewife, as the 
heart of the family:   
“we developed our stores, particularly large ones, to offer an experience for the 
whole family. For example, we provide shopping trolleys with calculators and list 
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holders for the husband and wife to control their budget and trolleys with plastic cars 
in front for kids to enjoy”. (Sainsbury Marketing Manager, British national) 
 
To reflect this, the communication strategy focused on portraying the family.  The 
brand promise was captured in the slogan “Everyday is a Feast at Sainsbury’s”.  This 
phrase represented a low price promise of food and fun for the family, as a feast in 
Egypt is associated with eating and fun for everyone.  
The Sainsbury strategy proved extremely popular amongst Egyptian customers 
because they were offered a wide choice of food at low prices in what was otherwise a 
closed, inefficient and expensive food retailing system. Customers felt that 
Sainsbury’s provided freedom of choice compared to the indigenous system through 
the wider product range and the self-service system. Customers were able to 
customize their fresh food purchases via self-selection, which was not traditionally 
allowed in grocery stores. They could therefore assert their right to select the fresh 
food they wanted, rather than adhering to the traditional - accepting what they were 
given.  Several observations at the cheese counter illustrate this point, customers 
demanded cheese from the display in front of them, rather than accepting pre-cut 
items from the back of the counter, which is the traditional method. Often customers 
rejected cheese and meat because they had not seen it being prepared.  The 
Sainsbury’s low price offer was also an attractive proposition in a country with low 
gross national income per capita and high basic food consumption.  
Hence, customers bestowed a high regard and respect upon Sainsbury’s 
considering the retailer to be their “champion” (Eltahawy, 2000). As a result, when 
Sainsbury’s decided to withdraw from Egypt, several regrets were voiced.  Many 
customers praised the wider impact of Sainsbury’s on the local market and expressed 
pessimism for the future of customer orientation in Egypt (exhibit 1). They believed 
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that the local “incompetent” business strategies/practices would return to haunt them 
after Sainsbury’s disappeared.  
Exhibit One: Customer Disappointment with the Sainsbury Withdrawal  
“At Sainsbury’s we saw quality goods and good service on their hands, we hope this 
continues when it leaves. We really enjoyed well-priced imported goods. I guess that is 
because Sainsbury’s is not an Egyptian. Unfortunately, Egyptians mistreat us”. 
 
“I’m so sad that Sainsbury’s is leaving, it has raised the standard for the local 
competitors” 
 
“The Egyptian grocers are not as honest as foreigners. I see that clearly in any foreign 
product versus an Egyptian one. I hope honesty will prevail after Sainsbury’s leave”  
 
“the local retailers cannot do what Sainsbury’s did because they are not interested in 
helping customers but interested in helping themselves”.   
 
 
With regard to its employees, the Sainsbury Marketing Director argued that 
the company had adopted a philosophy of leading by example to help its Egyptian 
staff gain retail experience, whilst taking cultural differences into account.  For 
example:  
“when designing Sainsbury’s uniform for women working at the store, we had to take 
into consideration the Islamic scarf”.   
 
Besides, he stated that Sainsbury’s offered the highest salaries in the Egyptian grocery 
sector. The impact of raising the standard of living of employees is echoed in the 
words of one Egyptian employee:  
“I see this store as my home, which I started and I’m willing to fight for its 
survival…… it would have been our blessed source of living (should the company 
decided to stay in the market)”.  
 
As the ‘blessed source of living’, this Egyptian employee articulates a sense of 
security and contentment in his job, also reflected in the words “my home” and “fight 
for”.  Pride in the company was also indicated by the fresh food employees who 
informally called themselves “chefs” (in English)  on the shop floor to embrace 
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Sainsbury’s foreign expertise and status, and to differentiate themselves from lower 
status mainstream grocery sector workers, who are traditionally regarded as 
“servants”.  
  The evident enthusiasm amongst customers and employees for Sainsbury’s 
professional retail strategy of low priced quality food for all customers and well-paid 
jobs for employees provided an outward sanctity, encapsulated by Sainsbury’s 
superior technical strategy, when compared to the technical frailties of the existing 
domestic system. The impact of Sainsbury’s superior technical strategy on the 
Egyptian retail community can best be described as ‘culture shock’. The  social 
implications of this manifested themselves in swift and drastic shifts in existing 
market parameters: as customer consumption shifted from captivated to liberated; 
competitor market share shifted from secure to vulnerable; employee careers shifted 
from unsettled to stable; and the nation’s retail economy shifted from local to global. 
Such a significant technical shift in the overall retail culture caused massive market 
destabilization which was interpreted by both customers and employees as 
unrighteous - giving rise to Sainsbury’s as embodying the unsavoury persona of Mr. 
Hyde.         
Sainsbury’s as Mr. Hyde: the inward iniquity of Sainsbury’s strategy  
Mr. Hyde has been portrayed in the tale as an unrighteous ‘social villain’.   To 
illustrate the rise of the Mr. Hyde persona out of Dr Jekyll’s righteous persona in the 
Sainsbury’s case, the reactions of customers and employees to Dr Jekyll’s persona 
will be analysed to reveal the socio-ethical impact of Sainsbury’s technical sanctity.  
i) customer reactions to their liberation   
Despite widespread customer appreciation of the new found “freedom” in the 
grocery sector provided by Sainsbury, Egyptians customers transferred several aspects 
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of their traditional shopping behaviour into the modern supermarkets setting.  This 
was witnessed via several observations on the shop floor (exhibit 2) 
 
Exhibit 2 : Observations of Customer Shop Floor Behaviour  
Observation1: As they usually did with traditional shopkeepers, customers 
bargained with cashiers to get lower prices.   
 
Observation 2: Rather than looking to the relevant price ticket themselves, 
customers constantly asked the employees who stocked the shelves about the 
prices of items, which is the norm in the pop and mom shops.   
 
Observation 3: Although the tipping of staff was not allowed in the Sainsbury 
store, customers were trying to force tips on staff as this was the norm in the 
Egyptian grocery system. One customer had to force a butcher, who was torn 
between the social norm and company policy, to take his tip saying : “you are 
embarrassing me… take it….take it”.   
In general customers’ argued against the no tipping policy of the store. As a 
customer said “I’m in favor of giving tips if it is a kind of appreciation after a 
work done by an employee for me”.  
 
Observation 4: Although checkouts were located at the store exit, the common 
reaction to not finding a till on the service counter or close by to pay for the 
goods, was “Where can I pay for these products?”  
As these examples illustrate, the majority of Egyptians customers had difficulty in 
adapting some aspects of their traditional shopping behaviour to the new “liberal” 
grocery system, and were stunned by the “unnatural” freedom provided by the 
Sainsbury supermarket.  The reaction of poorer consumers was particularly ugly 
unveiling the socio-economic norms that gave rise to the self-destructive side (Mr. 
Hyde) of the Sainsbury strategy.  One customer summed up the reaction to liberation: 
 ‘the Sainsbury’s system (organized stores offering merchandise at affordable prices) 
is good but it doesn’t suit our buying habits that mistreat and out smart any system”. 
 
This was echoed in another customer comment: 
“the problem with Sainsbury’s Egypt is the Egyptians’ behavior: they misuse, cheat 
and steal. I’m so sorry to say that but it is a fact”.  
 
Examples were found, in all areas of the store operation of customers attempting to 
abuse the system (see exhibit 3).  
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Exhibit 3 : Cases of Customer Abuses of the System 
 
“people here (in Egypt) don’t taste but eat from the tasting samples. One person can 
finish the whole sampling pot. Thus we abandoned it”. British Customer Service 
Manager, on food sampling 
 
 “People don’t wait till a trolley of special offers items are placed on shelves; they 
jump into the trolley to grab the stuff”.  Egyptian Fishmonger 
 
“People use a trick to fool the cashier. They buy say a cartoon of 24 pieces and add 
some more from another carton to fool the cashier when using the scanner so as to 
take a bit more for their money”.  Egyptian Cashier 
 
 “stealing is everywhere, in stores and even warehouses. It has brought Sainsbury’s 
down”. Egyptian Maintenance Employee 
 
 “The thieves are too many, the majority of them are poor people but in some cases we 
caught wealthy people stealing too due to illness that makes them cannot resist the 
temptation”.  Egyptian Head of Store Security 
 
The researcher’s own observations confirmed several cases of theft in the store.  The 
customer service officers provided further examples of system misuse and cheating, 
claiming that customers usually drank, ate, or tried goods on display without paying 
for them, or barcodes were removed to claim a faulty goods discount.  Some 
customers complained about these behaviours at the customer service desk:  
 “ I blame careless customers for the failure of Sainsbury’s, they eat the food inside 
and do not pay the price, I even asked a women to pay the price of what she ate, she 
said I’ll do that when I finish!”  
 
“I saw customers drinking from bottles and leaving them on the shelf inside the store 
yesterday…It was mayhem yesterday and disgusting too”.  
 
The researcher’s own observations, when working on the customer service desk, 
supported these claims: one customer returned cream, because after purchase he had 
discovered that it had been opened and some of it was missing; whilst another 
customer returned a baby anti-colic liquid for the same reason.  
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Such customer in-store behavior created a hostile shopping atmosphere, 
earning Sainsbury a poor social reputation, particularly amongst the more affluent 
consumer groups (see exhibit 4) .  Those customers who were already acquainted  
Exhibit 4 : Customer Perceptions of Shopping Atmosphere 
 
“the place (Sainsbury’s store) is like traditional markets, very crowded and 
unorganized. It is like EL-GAM’EEIA—the traditional communist-style subsidized 
governmental food outlets”.  
 
“this place is for low classes, it is dangerous to be there, you could even be harassed 
there”.  
 
“I cannot shop here with my wife because she could be harassed here…it is mayhem 
here”  
 
“I tried to go to Sainsbury’s at midnight or even the early hours of the mourning to 
avoid the aggressive crowds but my attempts were in vein as it is always….always 
unbearably crowded”.  
 
with supermarkets and the self-service system were full of remorse and were furious 
with their compatriots. An Egyptian customer, who lived in the Gulf area, said: 
“Sainsbury’s system is world-wide, the Gulf area for example uses a similar system, 
but here in Egypt, the locals made it unsuccessful because they misuse it. I don’t know 
what could be the answer to why we (Egyptians) have style of our own”.   
 
Another customer, who had experienced supermarkets in the US, was equally harsh in 
his criticism: 
“Customers here in Egypt are not civilized, strict control over them is needed”.   
The desire for control over customer behavior in the store was a popular 
request among some Egyptian customers: 
 “There must be a control over customer behavior in store in order not to spoil the 
good things at the store—the nice system of ‘value for money”.  
 
Customers even suggested ways that Sainsbury could exert control.  Wealthier 
customers saw market segmentation as a natural response within an already 
segregated society:   
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 “Sainsbury’s has no clear intentions of what it wants to be. Sainsbury’s is trying to 
target everybody at once. When you go to the stores, it is very chaotic…..You can 
never shop because people push you, or even bring you down ….. Shopping there is 
intimidating. This style (targeting the masses) simply is impossible in Egypt because 
people here are not like that.  This style could be successful in their homeland but 
certainly not here in Egypt”.  (Marketing Consultant) 
 
Less wealthy customers had an alternative view, based upon the need to educate 
customers to make them more familiar with the supermarket: 
 “The bad thing at Sainsbury’s is the behavior of the customers, there is a need for 
strong control over that behavior to make the customers respect the place. I’d like this 
control in the form of help rather than mere control.”  (Government Employee) 
 
Whether through market segmentation or market education, the underlying 
lesson from these comments is that acknowledging cultural differences should go 
beyond the visible and shallow antecedents of business behaviour typified by the 
Marketing Manager’s comment: 
 “the respect for the (Egyptian) culture can be seen in presenting the Arabic 
translation of Sainsbury’s brand name on all communications first and in a bigger 
font than that in English”.  
 
… to encompass a deeper understanding of culture and the social embeddedness of 
culture in societal attitudes and behaviour.   
These examples of the misuse and abuse of the supermarket system shed light 
on the profound impact of embedded socio-economic norms on customers’ ability to 
understand and realize the full benefits of technical superiority.  Without this 
understanding the sustainability of a retail offer in a host culture is under threat.  One 
comment by the Customer Service Deputy Manager about customer (mis)behaviour in 
the store sums up the situation “customers will never care as long as they don’t lose 
(technically)”. In other words, the (mis)behaviour of the Egyptian customers was the 
reaction to a system that technically indulged its customers (good prices, variety, etc.) 
without adapting to their social attitudes. This imbalance ultimately prevented the 
company from effectively delivering its promised values.  Substantiating this 
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viewpoint, the British customer service manager blamed the company’s desire to 
standardize its strategy/system at the store level for failing to acknowledge and adapt 
to the Egyptian retail social norms, commenting that “Sainsbury’s wanted to make the 
stores too British” and therefore, she argued, made it difficult to sustain the business 
in the country.  
ii) customers reaction to the local competitors’ vulnerability 
In a historically closed retail grocery market, Sainsbury’s competitors (the 
independent retailers) were enjoying a stable and secure market share prior to its 
arrival.  The Sainsbury retail strategy had the effect of undercutting prices and 
breaking the usual supermarket positioning in Egypt by appealing to the masses rather 
than just the elite. This placed many of the independent food retailers in a very 
vulnerable position, as both rich and poor customers defected to Sainsbury’s,  leading 
to a 40% drop in sales for some independent retailers in the locality (Eltahawy, 2000; 
Huband, 2000; Bryant, 2000; Drummond, 2001).  
Hence, Sainsbury’s strategy was seen as a declaration of war by the local 
traders. Vulnerable to Sainsbury’s superior operating strategy, competitors reacted by 
aggressively asserting their presence, both formally and informally, in an attempt to 
save their livelihood.  They collectively filed a formal complaint to the Egyptian 
Chamber of Commerce against Sainsbury’s pricing strategy, describing it as a 
dishonourable monopoly act.  This intervention forced Sainsbury’s to negotiate an 
agreement not to sell below factory prices (MEED, 2000; Salem, 2000).  
More informal methods included calls to religious leaders to portray 
Sainsbury’s as the “devils’ son”, and to customers to boycott the chain because of its 
devastating effect on the local traders’ livelihoods (Eltahawy, 2000). They also 
capitalised on the September 2000 Palestinian uprising.  This event ignited anti-
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western feelings amongst Egyptians and fuelled a rumour that Sainsbury’s was Jewish 
owned and helped Israel financially.  This direct link between Sainsbury and the 
‘enemy’ (Israel) even led to the stoning of stores by students (Dawoud and Whitaker, 
2000; Davies, 2000; Drummond, 2001). These efforts also saw the Sainsbury’s brand 
appear on an informal boycott list of western brands distributed throughout Cairo 
bearing the slogan “Boycotting the enemies is not only a national duty but also a 
religious one”.  
By placing their technical struggle in a social (political and religious) context, 
competitors saw customers react with sympathy and solidarity (see exhibit 5).  The 
Sainsbury’s ‘value for money’ strategy was interpreted by many customers as a 
politically motivated conspiracy to control and/or damage the food market in Egypt.  
Although some customers recognized the ultimate motive behind these accusations :  
“the Jewish link with Sainsbury’s is used by its competitors because the store was 
dumping prices and hence taking business away from them.   
 
the boycott clearly influenced many customers’ willingness to deal with the retailer: 
 
 “Sainsbury’s offered a flawless system, availability of goods in one place and at good 
prices. What brought Sainsbury’s down is the boycott I guess”.   
 
and the British Store Manager confirmed this view:  “religious issues are the main 
reasons behind the slow down of sales…”  
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 Exhibit 5 : Consumer Reaction to Portrayals of Sainsbury as the “enemy” 
 
“Sainsbury’s is reducing prices in a dramatic way. This can only indicate its intention 
to destroy small retailers or raise suspicion about the quality of its merchandise. In 
both cases, it is trying to destroy our country and economy”. 
 
“My husband and I stopped going to Sainsbury’s when we found they have a Jewish 
link. They have a massive power and I think they are trying to control our economy 
and destroy the Egyptian grocery businesses. Thus, we decided that we would never go 
there and continue buying everything from the local groceries as we used to”.  
 
“I never go there and asked my husband not go as well. If we do, those Jews will 
destroy the poor Egyptian traditional grocer.” 
 
“being Jewish made my wife insisted on boycotting and she never buys from them any 
more”. 
After the sale of Sainsbury’s to its local partner some customers returned to 
the stores, justifying their actions within the social/moral framework: 
 “the change of management to Egyptians is good because skepticism of being Jewish 
has been erased. I hope they will be the applying the same system of low prices 
though”.  
 
One female customer showed her intention  to make use of the technical (low price) 
offer, but only within the correct social context, when she asked a cashier to give her a 
plastic bag bearing the EDGE brand (the local partner’s brand name) rather than the 
Sainsbury’s brand.  When asked why by the researcher she replied: 
 “I know Sainsbury’s has been sold. I’m here now to buy for the first time because I 
want to buy from Egyptians not Jews”.   
 
In summary, the vulnerable competitors resorted to using social and moral 
pressure, in the form of politics and religion, to influence customers and to protect 
their livelihoods against a technically superior foreign competitor.  By alienating the 
incumbent members of the host retail market through technical superiority, an 
incoming retailer risks instigating a “clash of civilisations” (e.g. closed vs. free market 
in Egypt), where the hosts aggressively assert their identity through appeals to socio-
moral norms.  The aggressive reaction of the local independent grocery retailers in 
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Egypt, helped to change the positive perceptions of  Sainsbury’s technical superiority 
into social inferiority in the eyes of the Egyptian customer.  
iii) employee reactions to their job stability 
As noted earlier, through the offer of higher salaries and foreign expertise, 
Sainsbury’s Egyptian employees developed a strong sense of stability and 
contentment in their jobs, even describing Sainsbury’s as their ‘home’.  Nevertheless, 
saying something is home is different from feeling at home, as Sainsbury’s employees 
became frustrated that they were unable to fully contribute to their ‘home’ (exhibit 6) 
 
Exhibit 6 : Employee Reactions to Lack of Engagement 
 
“the English trust themselves only, even if they are clearly wrong. They deprive us 
from having a say despite our good knowledge of the market. We see clear-cut 
mistakes but we cannot talk or you may talk but no one will hear you about many 
serious mistakes that they later paid a heavy price for” (Head Fishmonger) 
 
“they brought a British butcher to show us some cuts. We said this won’t work in 
Egypt and we were right they had to come back to our style because his style proved a 
failure”. (Butcher) 
 
“Managers never discuss …they want things to happen their way, which sometimes is 
clearly wrong. For instance, they force us to sell things marked on the shelf for L.E. 
44 for L.E. 5 because the machine said so, the system is obviously wrong!!” (Cashier) 
 
“They brought a cashier system from the UK that depends on too much honesty by the 
cashier and hence the control over the cashier actions was so poor…Due to poverty 
here in Egypt, as you know, people steal when they find no control over them. We 
warned against this and kept saying this is wrong but they insisted on it till 
tremendous losses started to appear and the imbalance of tills is almost a daily 
problem. Some cashiers were caught putting money in their socks and things like that 
(with a smile). We showed them that we know this will happen and finally they were 
convinced that we were right. The imbalance amongst the tills has been reduced 
dramatically since then.”  (Customer Service Manager) 
The above cases suggest that the British management ignored the willingness 
and desire of store employees to work with them in order to share local market 
knowledge. As they became passive contributors, employee morale fell and they 
retaliated by pursuing immoral activities just to obey orders:  
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“… we are forced to meet our sales target so we started to reprocess the meat so as to 
sell it as fresh even when it is edging closer to expire. We did it to meet our sales 
target on which they strictly judge us.”  (Butcher) 
 
Managerial arrogance throughout the period in Egypt was regarded by many store 
employees as the main reason for the company’s failure.  
It was not just the lack of  involvement that threatened the employees sense of 
belonging to their ‘home’ (Sainsbury’s) but also broken promises from the 
management about their job stability.  Whilst these decisions no doubt made business 
sense they also carried socio-ethical implications, as job security is a norm in the 
Egyptian workplace.  A deli employee commented (with a strong sense of insecurity 
and helplessness) about the laying off of hundreds of employees who rejected a 
switch to part-time contracts instead of their original full-time contracts: “they made a 
lot of promises to us when we started but they never kept them”.  The British customer 
service manager substantiated this claim on the basis of  the employee rights outlined 
in the employee handbook “the shop floor employees were promised a lot in the 
employee handbook but they(company) never fulfilled….they (employees) have the 
right to be frustrated”.  One fishmonger was amongst those laid off, but he did not 
want to leave a job that he valued and enjoyed, and thus defended his right to carry on 
as a full-timer. He stood up for to the management and was reinstated on legal 
grounds as he proudly put it : “… those laid off are cowards because they feared 
standing for the company to defend their right to have their contracts honored but I 
did…sued them (the company)…I won… and here I am back in the job”   
In summary, despite their higher salaries and the promise of greater 
professional expertise, Sainsbury’s Egyptian employees began to lose morale due to a 
lack of involvement and engagement.  Store management that was perceived by 
employees as being dictatorial and merely standardizing operations on the British 
 29
model, contributed to this.  This highlights that two-way communication (i.e. a 
dialogue) between local employees and foreign management is vital to boost the 
morale of local employees, and to engage with the valuable market knowledge that 
they possess.  Besides, when promises are made in ignorance of the social norms 
governing them, a sense of betrayal abounds.  As a result, a deep understanding and 
respect of local work norms and continuous dialog with local employees could 
ultimately foster the legitimization of company HR practices to effectively deliver the 
retailer values in a foreign culture.  
This sense of alienation and betrayal reflects a perception of disrespect for the 
local norms which therefore mirrors the criticism of Sainsbury’s impact on the 
national economy in the era of globalization.   When it left Egypt, Sainsbury’s stated 
that the need to restructure the domestic business was the prime motive.  This 
infuriated local investment experts who questioned both the credibility of the 
company and its decision. Abed El-Hameed (2001) argued that despite the 
government unprecedented support for Sainsbury as the first major western 
supermarket chain to enter Egypt, Sainsbury let them down as it selfishly wants to 
solve its home market problems at the expense of Egypt’s reputation as an investment 
destination.  Al-Ahram Weekly (2001) added that Sainsbury’s presence did not 
improve the Egyptian economy, but made the situation worse by encouraging higher 
levels of consumerism, rather than productivity.  David Reader, the UK Commercial 
Counsellor in Egypt, countered that Sainsbury did have a positive economic impact 
on the Egyptian economy on two fronts. First, it created employment opportunities for 
Egyptians. Second, it fostered Egyptian exports via the sourcing of some private 
brand ranges for the UK and the US markets (Fitzpatrick, 2001).  
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Casting an eye on the charged debate over Sainsbury’s impact upon Egypt, it 
can be argued that it reflects the company’s split persona in the eyes of both 
customers and employees.  Two contradicting viewpoints are evident: one is anti-
Sainsbury’s (i.e. social inequity) when seen from socio-ethical standpoint; and the 
other is pro-Sainsbury’s (i.e. technical sanctity) when seen from a 
technical/economical standpoint.  
 
Sainsbury’s Egypt: discussion and concluding remarks  
 
Framing the ethnographic data and analysis within a constructed metaphor, 
allows us to communicate the managerial implications arising (i.e. create meaning) 
from this case study.  As Dr. Jekyll, Sainsbury’s Egypt demonstrated the outward 
persona of a technically superior retail strategy, but also exhibited Mr Hyde’s inward 
persona of social inferiority from the viewpoint of the social actors in the host culture 
(customers and employees).  This in turn, mirrored the controversial impact of 
Sainsbury’s on Egyptian society as reported in the local media.  Analysis of the social 
lessons learned from the behavior of the novel’s lead character can further enlighten 
the managerial lessons from this case. 
 According to Mighall (2003), the novel suggests that the good persona did not 
realize or admit that it was also housing a bad one.  This is evident in the Sainsbury’s 
case through the “secret” (i.e. unrecognised) nature of the inward iniquity, which was 
socially embedded and as such invisible to the company, yet clearly felt by the local 
stakeholders since it occurred in the shadow of the visible technical superiority.  The 
mysteriousness within the development of Mr. Hyde’s persona from that of Dr. Jekyll, 
as seen through the eyes of the local social actors, indicates that retailers need a more 
substantial understanding of the symbolic aspects of host cultures for effective 
 31
internationalization. The marginalization of deep rooted cultural and social norms has 
contributed to several cases of divestment by technically superior operators, such as 
Home Depot, Ahold, Carrefour and JC Penney, from Chile.  The business egotism 
(the outward technical sanctity) of these investors created social inward iniquity 
amongst the social actors in the host environment that later haunted them and 
pressured them to withdraw (Bianchi and Arnold, 2004; Bianchi, 2006; Bianchi and 
Ostale, 2006).    
Also, in the novel Dr. Jekyll consistently denied responsibility for Hyde’s evil 
actions. This behaviour is implicit in the assessment made by the British marketing 
director of the local traders’ aggressive reaction to Sainsbury – which he regarded 
simply as ‘jealousy’ - and his distancing of the company from any direct involvement 
in creating this reaction.  Such a denial of an “evil” face  may explain the well 
documented tendency by international retailers to be hesitant, secretive and restrictive 
about revealing details of their divestment experiences (Palmer, 2004; Alexander et al 
2005; Palmer and Quinn, 2007), and to admit “fault”.  
Looking at the interplay between the Jekyll and Hyde personas in the 
Sainsbury’s Egypt case from a macro viewpoint, the UK Commercial Councellor 
admitted that Sainsbury’s success (as Dr Jekyll) inexorably developed negative social 
consequences (as Mr. Hyde) within the country, but he blamed these consequences on 
the generic process of globalisation (Fitzpatrick, 2001).  This view coincides with the 
novels main conclusion that the Mr Hyde character is an integral part of human nature 
and thus the presence of a split persona is not a unique case but rather an embedded 
generic feature of social behavior (Mighall, 2003).  Nonetheless, in the novel it is 
revealed that Dr. Jekyll later knew he was housing Mr. Hyde and started deliberately 
unleashing Hyde when he so wished.  This raises the ultimate implication arising from 
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this case and the constructed metaphor for the socio-ethical legitimization process: if 
Mr. Hyde, revealed by this paper as the embedded social consequences of technical 
superiority, is a natural consequence of the globalization process of retailers as 
superior operators, what should international retailers do about it: continue ignoring it 
or confront it and proactively think about how to reduce its negative effect?    
Some responses may be found in the existing literature.  For example, the 
various efforts on market re-entry via changing the mode of entry (Burt, 1995) or by 
using private brand ‘implants’ onto local retailers’ shelves (Burt el al, 2005) may help 
to minimize the ‘Hyde effect’ as these actions are not solely based upon superior 
technical operations and involve collaborative partnerships with local retailers, who 
naturally possess a deeper social understanding of their local markets. For an 
ecologically sustainable legitimization process, the case presented here suggests that 
the contribution of organizations (international retailers) to the (global) environments 
in which they operate should be broadened from a mainstream capitalist approach to a 
localized socialist approach (Castro, 2004). This is a process that Thomas (2000) 
labeled as businesses becoming “citizen professionals”, where professionalism honors 
its lost civic side through balancing social and economic gains.  
Adopting an interpretive ethnographic mode of enquiry in this divestment case 
contributed to our understanding the legitimization process through “finding (socio- 
ethical) stories we don’t know we have lost” (Behar, 2003 p.17). Furthermore, the use 
of a metaphor based on a classic novel to frame and present the findings further 
enhanced our understanding of the symbolic role of institutional pressures and social 
codes in the legitimization process in host markets, echoing the central tenant of the 
institutional approach. This case further proves however that these pressures are not 
optional but rather inevitable for international retailers (especially superior operators) 
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and must be proactively embraced in order for companies to successfully establish 
and sustain themselves in a host market.   
Finally, as far as future research is concerned, understanding how to maximize 
the role of Dr. Jekyll and minimize that of Mr. Hyde is an opportunity that can foster 
a qualitative understanding of social cultures in destination markets as well as 
developing methods through which retailers can predict, assess and manage the 
interplay for legitimacy between elements of the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde persona that 
they (and we?) all posses.  
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